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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other cases of interest. As a
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION—ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS—STAY OF PROCEEDINGS PENDING
ARBITRATION
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) NA V. REIKOWSKI
In Citibank v. Reikowski,1 Sarah Reikowski appealed a district court
order that (1) denied her motion to vacate summary judgment; (2) granted
Citibank summary judgment; (3) denied her motion for a new trial; (4) denied her motion to vacate the order which vacated the stay of litigation
pending arbitration; and (5) dismissed her counterclaim.2 The North Dakota Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment motion, reversed the order denying summary judgment, and held the litigation should have been
stayed pending arbitration.3
Reikowski owed $13,612.45 to Citibank on a credit card account.4 Citibank sued and obtained a default judgment for the money due.5 In a 2005
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and
reversed and remanded the suit.6 In August 2007, Citibank moved for
summary judgment.7 Subsequently, on September 22, 2007, Reikowski
moved to stay the litigation pending arbitration.8 The credit card agreement
terms provided for a litigation stay pending arbitration.9 Citibank agreed to
arbitrate on September 28, 2007, so long as the arbitration complied with
the credit card agreement and commenced within 30 days.10 Even though
the parties agreed to stay the litigation pending arbitration, the district court
granted Citibank’s motion for summary judgment on October 1, 2007, entered judgment in favor of Citibank on October 24, 2007, and entered an
order staying litigation pending arbitration.11
On appeal, Reikowski argued that the district court erred because the
litigation should have been stayed in lieu of arbitration proceedings.12 To
support her assertion, she cited sections 3, 7, and 9 of the Federal Arbitra1. 2009 ND 12, 760 N.W.2d 97.
2. Reikowski, ¶ 1, 760 N.W.2d at 98.
3. Id. ¶ 13, 760 N.W.2d at 100.
4. Id. ¶ 2, 760 N.W.2d at 98.
5. Id. ¶ 3. Reikowski represented herself. 760 N.W.2d at 98.
6. Reikowski, ¶ 3. See also Citibank v. Reikowski, 2005 ND 133, 699 N.W.2d 851.
7. Reikowski, ¶ 3, 760 N.W.2d at 98.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 98-99.
12. Id. ¶ 4, 760 N.W.2d at 99.
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tion Act (FAA) and section 7 of the North Dakota Uniform Arbitration
Act.13 Citibank asserted that Reikowski waived her right to assert the North
Dakota Uniform Arbitration Act because she did not argue that North Dakota law would control in her appeal.14 Instead, Citibank argued that South
Dakota law should be applied.15 Citibank also noted that Reikowski had
not argued for South Dakota application of law.16 The credit card agreement contained an agreement that federal and South Dakota law would apply to any disputes.17
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Citibank and concluded
Reikowski had not argued for the application of South Dakota arbitration
law.18 The court noted its general rule, that the court will not consider
questions that were not raised before the district court.19 However, the
court also stated that it will consider and apply the appropriate statutes if the
results would otherwise be erroneous or incomplete applications of the
law.20
Therefore, the court considered South Dakota Codified Law section 2125A-7, which provides: “Any action or proceeding involving an issue
subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an
application therefore has been made under § 21-25A-5 [Application to
compel arbitration] or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect
thereto only.”21 The court stated that section 21-25A-7 required the district
court to stay the litigation until it considered the motion to stay litigation
and compel arbitration.22 The court noted that Reikowski made her motion
to stay litigation and compel arbitration before the court signed and entered
judgment on the summary judgment motion.23 Moreover, in addition to the
statute, the court cited Williston on Contracts, which provides “[o]rdinarily,
a court that is asked to stay proceedings pending arbitration must first
determine whether parties agreed to arbitrate and the scope of that

13. Id. ¶ 6.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The agreement provides: “Applicable Law: The terms and enforcement of this
Agreement shall be governed by federal law and the law of South Dakota, where we are located.”
Id.
18. Id. ¶ 7.
19. Id. (citing Griggs v. Fisher, 2006 ND 255, ¶ 8, 725 N.W.2d 201).
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 8, 760 N.W.2d at 100 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-7 (2004)).
22. Id. ¶ 9.
23. Id.
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agreement.”24 Because both parties had notified the district court that an
arbitration agreement existed and that this case fell within the agreement,
the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred by
failing to stay the litigation and granting summary judgment.25
The court also explained that it would have reached the same result under federal law.26 Section 3 of the FAA provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not
in default in proceeding with such arbitration.27
The court explained that it had applied South Dakota law to this dispute
and that section 7 of South Dakota Codified Laws is consistent with the
FAA.28 Thus, the court vacated the district court’s summary judgment and
judgment orders, reversed the order denying the motion to vacate summary
judgment, and remanded the case for entry of an order staying litigation
pending arbitration.29

24.
2001)).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. (citing 21 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:57, at 378 (4th ed.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CIVIL COMMITMENT—PETITION
FOR DISCHARGE
IN RE E.W.F.
In In re E.W.F.,30 E.W.F. appealed an order denying his petition for
discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual, contending
the State failed to prove that he was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and that his commitment violated his substantive
due process rights.31 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.32
In 1994, E.W.F. (at the time twenty-one years old) molested his fiveyear-old niece.33 After pleading guilty to gross sexual imposition in September 1995, he was sentenced to prison.34 Three years later, in September
1998, he was committed to the North Dakota State Hospital as a sexually
dangerous individual.35 For the following eight years, E.W.F. waived his
statutory right to annually petition for discharge.36 In September 2007, he
petitioned for discharge, and a hearing was held on January 3, 2008.37
State hospital staff psychologist Lynne Sullivan testified as an expert
witness for the State during the hearing.38 She testified that E.W.F. still
suffered from two sexual disorders—paraphelia not otherwise specified and
pedophilia.39 Dr. Sullivan based her opinion on review of E.W.F.’s prior
evaluations and current reports of his behavior at the state hospital.40 In
September 2007, Dr. Sullivan had prepared a Sexually Dangerous
Individual Annual Re-evaluation Report, which the State filed with the
district court prior to the hearing.41 The report was not served upon E.W.F.
or his counsel; nor was it offered by the State at the hearing.42
The district court found E.W.F. continued to be a sexually dangerous
individual and denied his petition for discharge on January 9, 2008.43
E.W.F. appealed, arguing the State failed to prove by clear and convincing
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

2008 ND 130, 751 N.W.2d 686.
In re E.W.F., ¶¶ 1, 7, 751 N.W.2d at 688-89.
Id. ¶ 1, 751 N.W.2d at 688.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6, 751 N.W.2d at 689.
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evidence that he was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory
conduct and that his substantive due process rights were violated.44 The
state supreme court reviewed under a modified clearly erroneous standard,
under which civil commitments of sexually dangerous individuals are affirmed unless the district court’s order is induced by an erroneous view of
the law, or if the court is firmly convinced the order is not supported by
clear and convincing evidence.45
E.W.F.’s first argument was that the State failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was likely to engage in further acts of sexually
predatory conduct.46 His argument was based on the fact that the State did
not offer Dr. Sullivan’s written annual report during E.W.F.’s hearing.47
The court concluded that contrary to E.W.F.’s contention, the State was not
required to offer the report during the hearing; nor was it required to submit
the report to E.W.F.48 Under section 25-03.3-17(2) of the North Dakota
Century Code, the State must conduct an annual examination of a committed individual’s mental condition, and a report regarding that examination
“must be provided to the court that committed the individual.”49 The statute
does not require that the report be offered during the defendant’s hearing;
nor must the report be submitted to the defendant himself.50 Similarly, the
court wrote that section 25-03.3-18 of the North Dakota Century Code does
not require that the written report be offered during the petition for discharge hearing.51
Furthermore, while E.W.F. did exercise his right to an independent
psychological evaluation, he did not call the independent psychologist to
testify during the discharge hearing.52 The court held it was not improper
for the district court to draw a negative inference from E.W.F.’s failure to

44. Id. ¶ 7.
45. Id. ¶ 8 (citing In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 17, 745 N.W.2d 631).
46. Id. ¶ 11. The State must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, three elements before
an individual may be committed: 1) That the individual engaged in sexually predatory conduct; 2)
That the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder,
a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and 3) That the condition makes
the individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a
danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8).
Here, E.W.F. did not contend the State failed to meet its burden on the first two elements. In re
E.W.F., ¶ 11, 751 N.W.2d at 689. Instead, he argued solely that the State failed to prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that he was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct. Id.
47. Id. ¶ 12.
48. Id. ¶ 13, 751 N.W.2d at 690 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-17 and 25-03.3-18).
49. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-17).
50. Id.
51. Id. ¶ 14 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-18).
52. Id. ¶ 16.
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call the independent psychologist; indeed, the district court could use the
negative inference in determining whether there was clear and convincing
evidence of E.W.F.’s likelihood of engaging in further acts of sexually predatory conduct.53
E.W.F. next contended that his substantive due process rights were violated, alleging his civil commitment served as an unconstitutional mechanism for punishing his underlying criminal conviction.54 First, the court concluded E.W.F. gave no factual argument that his psychiatric diagnosis, and
the severity of the mental abnormality itself, was not sufficient to distinguish him from the dangerous, but typical, recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case, the standard required by the United States Supreme
Court case Kansas v. Crane.55 Next, E.W.F. contended that his commitment lasted more than a “potentially indefinite” period of time, in violation
of the United States Supreme Court holding of Kansas v. Hendricks.56 He
based this contention on the fact that he had been committed for nine years
without improvement, and on the fact that the State committed about sixty
sex offenders in the last ten years, none of whom had been released for successful completion in a treatment program.57 The state supreme court determined that the fact that E.W.F. had been at the state hospital for a period
of nine years, without more, did not show he would remain there indefinitely.58 The court concluded by stating that because E.W.F.’s constitutional
claims were not supported with substantial fact or law, the claims were not
ripe for review.59
The court affirmed the district court’s order denying E.W.F.’s petition
for discharge.60

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 691.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 19 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002)).
Id. ¶ 20, 751 N.W.2d at 692 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997)).
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL
TRIALS—JURY QUESTIONNAIRES
FORUM COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY V. PAULSON
In Forum Communications Company v. Paulson,61 Forum Communications petitioned for a supervisory writ directing the district court to vacate
its order sealing juror questionnaires and any other information that would
help identify the full names of jurors in a concluded murder trial.62 The
North Dakota Supreme Court issued a supervisory writ reversing the district
court’s order and directing the district court to consider Forum Communications’ request for information under the guidelines set forth by the court.63
Moe Maurice Gibbs was charged in Barnes County, North Dakota,
with the murder of Mindy Morgenstern, a Valley City State University student.64 The case was assigned to Judge John T. Paulson, a district court
judge in the Southeast Judicial District. Pretrial publicity caused the trial to
be moved from Valley City in Barnes County to Minot in Ward County.65
The district court approved expanded media coverage of the trial in June
2007, but also issued an order restricting extrajudicial comments to the public or to the media.66
The State and Gibbs stipulated to the use of a jury questionnaire for
prospective jurors to answer before trial.67 The thirty-four page questionnaire covered several broad categories, including personal information, residence, family, education, employment, previous employment, personal,
military, law enforcement and legal contacts, criminal justice system, juror
service, and miscellaneous.68 The parties also stipulated that the questionnaire would be held confidential, with the exception of distribution to court
personnel, attorneys-of-record, and the parties themselves.69 The district
court approved the stipulation.70
Voir dire proceedings during the Minot trial were closed to the public
and the media.71 At one point during the trial, a district court judge for the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

2008 ND 140, 752 N.W.2d 177.
Forum Commc’ns Co., ¶ 1, 752 N.W.2d at 178.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
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Northwest Judicial District issued a disorderly conduct restraining order
against a Bismarck resident attending the trial.72 The jury in the Minot trial
deadlocked on a verdict, and the trial was rescheduled for October 2007, in
Bismarck.73
The district court in the second trial issued a scheduling order requiring
each prospective juror to complete the juror questionnaire used in the first
trial.74 Forum Communications moved to open courtroom proceedings, including voir dire, to the public, to unseal court documents, including the
completed jury questionnaires, and to vacate the gag order.75 The district
court ordered that the public be allowed access to jury voir dire, subject to
closure whenever counsel believed sensitive subjects would be discussed
with prospective jurors.76 The district court also granted access to a blank
juror questionnaire, but left intact the order restricting extrajudicial comments.77 During five days of jury selection in Bismarck, the public and the
media were allowed to attend voir dire, subject to some in camera proceedings, but the jurors were referred to only by their first names and the initial
of their last names.78 In November 2007, the Bismarck jury returned a
guilty verdict.79
In December 2007 and January 2008, Forum Communications asked
the district court to release the names of the jurors in the Bismarck trial.80
The district court sealed the juror questionnaires and any other identifying
information until “such time as any appeal, or any ordered retrial and appeal
therefrom have been determined.”81 The district court stated as reasoning
for its order that “the Court gave its word to the jurors . . . that it would protect those jurors’ identity as confidential. And . . . the Court had previous
harassment problems of jurors and counsel from a Bismarck man when the
case was tried in Minot, North Dakota.”82 Forum Communications petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to issue a supervisory writ reversing the district court’s order.83

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 178-79.
Id. ¶ 5, 752 N.W.2d at 179.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In its decision, the state supreme court began by concluding the case
was an appropriate one to exercise its original jurisdiction because it involved “issues of vital concern about the interrelationship of guidelines for
public and media access to court records, for juror privacy, and for a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.”84 Additionally, the court found no adequate remedy by appeal existed to resolve the issues.85
The court first noted that the general public and the media have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials.86 The court cited Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,87 a United States Supreme Court case that
gave two major rationales for the right of access to criminal trials—first,
that criminal trials have historically been open to the press and the general
public and second, that openness enhances the quality and safeguards the
integrity of the fact-finding process for both the defendant and society as a
whole.88
The right of access, however, is not absolute.89 The court again cited
Globe, writing, “Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny
the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information,
it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”90
The court turned to Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,91 which
held that jury voir dire is part of a criminal trial and is thus subject to the
same right of access.92 A presumption exists in favor of jury selection being as open to the public as any other part of a criminal trial.93 The presumption may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings
that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.94 Furthermore, the findings must be articulated specifically enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order
was properly entered.95
84. Id. ¶ 9, 752 N.W.2d at 180.
85. Id.
86. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44-85 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984); Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603
(1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558-81 (1980)).
87 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
88. Forum Commc’ns Co., ¶ 11, 752 N.W.2d at 181 (citing Globe, 457 U.S. at 604-06).
89. Id.
90. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Globe, 457 U.S. at 604-06).
91. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
92. Forum Commc’ns Co., ¶ 12, 752 N.W.2d at 181 (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at
505).
93. Id. ¶ 13, 752 N.W.2d at 182 (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 505-10).
94. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510).
95. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510).
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The court stated that the right of access articulated in Press-Enterprise
has been applied to preliminary jury questionnaires, such as the one at issue
in Forum Communications.96 Thus, both the public and media have a presumptive right of access to juror questionnaires that is not absolute and that
must be balanced against both a defendant’s right to a fair trial and jurors’
privacy interests.97 The presumption of openness can be overcome only by
an overriding interest and must be articulated with findings specific enough
to permit effective review.98 Finally, any closure must be narrowly tailored
to serve the competing interests.99
The court went on to note that section 27-09.1-09(3) of the North Dakota Century Code requires public access to jurors’ names unless the interests of justice require the names be kept confidential.100 The “interests-ofjustice” standard has been interpreted to mean that the trial court must give
specific and convincing reasons juror identities should be withheld, and that
withholding should occur only in exceptional cases.101
Furthermore, the court cited North Dakota Supreme Court Administrative Rule 41, which requires public access to court records, with certain exceptions.102 The first applicable exception is N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R.
41(5)(b)(5), which states that the names of qualified or summoned jurors
and contents of jury qualification forms are open to the public unless by
court order disclosure is prohibited or restricted.103 The second applicable
exception is N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41(5)(b)(6), which states that records
of juror voir dire are not open to the public, unless by court order disclosure
is permitted.104 Under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41(6)(b), when a request
for public access is made, a court must decide whether sufficient grounds
exist to overcome the presumption of openness of court records and may
prohibit access according to applicable constitutional, statutory, and case
law.105 In making a decision whether to permit or prohibit access, the court
must consider that the presumption of openness may be overcome only by
an overriding interest, which must be specifically articulated and narrowly
tailored.106
96. Id. ¶ 16.
97. Id. at 183.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 17 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27.09.1-09(3)).
101. Id. (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 1990)).
102. Id. ¶ 18 (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41).
103. Id. ¶ 19, 752 N.W.2d at 184 (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41(5)(b)(5)).
104. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41(5)(b)(6)).
105. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41(6)(b)).
106. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41(6)(b)).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the district court’s
decision to seal all information pertaining to juror identification was based
on two articulated reasons: (1) that the district court gave “its word to
jurors . . . that it would protect those jurors’ identity as confidential,” and
(2) “previous harassment problems of jurors and counsel from a Bismarck
man when the case was tried in Minot.”107 The court found those reasons
insufficient to rebut the presumption of openness and to warrant a blanket
closure, stating the public and the media have a First Amendment right of
post-verdict access to jurors’ names.108 That right may be limited by
articulated findings to protect privacy or juror safety, but the court found
nothing in the record to suggest either harassment problems of the jurors
during the Bismarck trial or any impending threats of juror harassment or
safety.109 Additionally, the court concluded that the district court did not
articulate any specific findings to support closure to protect juror privacy or
safety after the jury was discharged.110 Thus, the court held that the names
of the jurors who were sworn and tried the case to verdict must be released
after notice was sent to each of them.111
Next, the court stated that the district court’s findings did not support a
blanket closure of the Bismarck trial jurors’ questionnaires.112 The desire
of the trial judge to protect jurors, the court wrote, must be balanced against
the right to access under the Press-Enterprise test.113 The court also recognized that expanded questionnaires are a way of obtaining personal information from perspective jurors in a manner other than in open court.114 Finally, the court suggested that the expanded jury questionnaires be
accompanied by a paragraph that states in unambiguous language that the
questionnaires will become public records, and that prospective jurors can
respond to the questions by requesting a closed appearance before the judge
with counsel and the accused present.115 The judge can then decide if that
portion of jury selection should be available under Press-Enterprise.116
The court remanded for the district court to consider the questionnaires
of the Bismarck jurors and to determine if an overriding interest for closure
overcame the presumption of openness under Press-Enterprise and N.D.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. ¶ 20, 752 N.W.2d at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
Id.
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Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41.117 The court held that at a minimum, recognized
privacy concerns required redaction of jurors’ dates of birth and non-public
addresses and telephone numbers.118 The court also directed the district
court to consider possible redaction of questions pertaining to medications,
whether jurors were victims of crimes, and information regarding racial and
ethnic groups.119 The court exercised its original jurisdiction and issued a
supervisory writ reversing the district court’s order and directing the court
to consider Forum Communications’ request for information under the
guidelines set forth.120
Chief Justice VandeWalle specially concurred.121 He wrote that in addition to the law cited in the opinion, N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 9 is also involved in selecting juries.122 Rule 9(5) states that the administration and
management of the jury system must comply with the Standards Relating to
Juror Use and Management, which are incorporated in the rule as an appendix.123 Standard 7, which governs voir dire, states that basic background
information should be made available in writing to counsel or each selfrepresented party, unless disclosure is limited by the court in accordance
with section 27-09.1-09 of the North Dakota Century Code.124 That section, as the majority opinion noted, provides that the names of qualified jurors and the contents of jury qualification forms “shall be made available to
the public unless the court determines in any instance that this information
in the interest of justice should be kept confidential or its use limited in
whole or in part.”125 Standard 7 also requires the judge to ensure that the
privacy of prospective jurors is reasonably protected, and that questioning
by counsel is consistent with the purposes of voir dire.126
Chief Justice VandeWalle next noted that N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 9(3)
provides that the State Court Administrator shall file a jury selection plan
with the Clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court.127 Rule 9(3) goes on to
state that the plan “shall detail the procedures to be followed in selecting
and managing jurors in order to implement the policies set forth” in the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 26 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 9).
Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 9(5)).
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-09).
Id. at 187 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-09).
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 28 (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 9(3)).
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Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act.128 The jury selection plan recognizes a distinction between the juror qualification form, which contains only
questions about the qualifications of the prospective juror to sit on any jury,
and the jury questionnaire, which seeks information that the parties or their
counsel use in determining whether a prospective juror should be challenged for cause or peremptorily removed from a panel in a particular
case.129 It is the questionnaire, Chief Justice VandeWalle noted, that may
ask questions that call for answers which should remain confidential due to
juror privacy.130 Thus, in an effort to reasonably protect the privacy of
prospective jurors, the district court in future cases may be unwilling to allow an expanded jury questionnaire.131
Additionally, Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote, it is problematic that
counsel will ask each juror the amount of questions that may be included in
an expanded jury questionnaire during voir dire in open court.132 Therefore,
he noted, the agreement to keep the questionnaires confidential has some
logical purpose—but the sweep of confidentiality in this case was too
great.133 Chief Justice VandeWalle concluded his concurrence by highlighting the balancing process between the public’s right to access and the
juror’s right to privacy.134

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 9(3)).
Id. ¶ 30.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 33, 752 N.W.2d at 187-88.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SPECIAL LAWS, PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES, GIFTS
TEIGEN V. STATE
In Teigen v. State,135 James Teigen, Deb Lundgren, Greg Svenningsen,
the North Dakota Farmers Union, and the Dakota Resource Council appealed a summary judgment dismissing their declaratory judgment action.136 They challenged the constitutionality of language in sections 4-2807(4) and 4-28-07.1(4) of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to the
North Dakota State Wheat Commission.137
The statute requires the North Dakota State Wheat Commission to
expend at least two mills of a wheat tax for contracts for activities related to
domestic wheat policy issues, wheat production, promotion, and sales.138
The statute also requires the contracts to be between no more than two trade
associations that are incorporated in the state and that have as their primary
purpose the representation of wheat producers.139 The plaintiffs claimed the
law effectively compels the State Wheat Commission to contract with two
specific entities, the North Dakota Grain Growers Association and the
Durum Growers Association of the United States.140 The plaintiffs also
claimed the statute violates state constitutional provisions that prohibit
special laws, gifts, and special privileges and immunities.141
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the law was constitutional, and
affirmed.142 The court first stated that the issue of whether a statute is
constitutional is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.143 It noted
the court exercises the power to declare legislation unconstitutional with
great restraint and will not do so unless at least four justices agree on the
unconstitutionality.144
The court began its analysis with whether the statute violates the
special law provision of the North Dakota constitution, which prohibits the

135. 2008 ND 88, 749 N.W.2d 505.
136. Teigen, ¶ 1, 749 N.W.2d at 507.
137. Id. The same language, after the 2009 legislative session, is found in section 4.1-13-23
of the North Dakota Century Code.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. ¶ 7, 749 N.W.2d at 509.
144. Id.
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legislature from enacting local or special laws.145 Special laws, the court
stated, are those relating to particular persons or things of a class.146 The
plaintiffs argued the effect of the trade association clause is to create a
special law, contending that while the language of the statute is neutral, the
underlying intent and effect is that contracts go only to the Grain Growers
Association and the Durum Growers Association.147
The court laid out the standard of review of a classification under the
special laws provision—reasonableness.148 A statutory classification is reasonable, the court stated, if it is “natural, not arbitrary, and standing upon
some reason having regard to the character of the legislation of which it is a
feature.”149 The court went on to state that a classification is reasonable if it
“bears alike upon all persons and things upon which it operates and it contains no provision that will exclude or impede this uniform operation upon
all citizens, subjects and places within the state provided they are brought
within the relations and circumstances specified in the statute.”150
The court then went through previous case law regarding special law
provisions, noting that the common inquiry in special law cases is whether
statutory classifications are written in general terms, rather than applying to
particular persons or things.151 Additionally, if written in general terms, the
court examines whether the classification “closes the door against accessions to the class.”152 The court recognized that special law challenges necessarily involve statutory interpretation, a question of law fully reviewable
on appeal.153
The court stated that the trade association clause is phrased in general
terms that “contracts may be with no more than two trade associations that
are incorporated in this state and which have as their primary purpose the
representation of wheat producers.”154 The plain language of the clause, the
court opined, does not contemplate a closed class and does not preclude
other organizations from further accession into the class if they meet those
qualifications.155 Instead, the clause operates alike for all similarly situated

145. Id. ¶ 9.
146. Id. ¶ 12, 749 N.W.2d at 510 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Heitkamp, 523 N.W.2d
548 (N.D. 1994)).
147. Id. ¶ 9, 749 N.W.2d at 509.
148. Id. ¶ 13, 749 N.W.2d at 510.
149. Id. (quoting Best Prods. Co., Inc. v. Spaeth, 461 N.W.2d 91, 99 (N.D. 1990)).
150. Id. at 511 (quoting Best Prods., 461 N.W.2d at 99).
151. Id. ¶ 18, 749 N.W.2d at 512.
152. Id. (quoting Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N.D. 270, 50 N.W. 970 (1891)).
153. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19, 749 N.W.2d at 513.
154. Id. ¶ 20.
155. Id.
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entities that satisfy the statutory requirements for a contract.156 The court
also stated that because the language of the trade association clause is clear
and unambiguous, it would not resort to legislative history or administrative
interpretation to construe the plain meaning of the statute.157 Thus, the
court concluded the trade association clause is a general law, and the general classification for trade associations incorporated in North Dakota that
have as their primary purpose the representation of wheat producers is reasonable in view of the contractual services sought by the state wheat commission.158
The plaintiffs next argued that the trade association clause is unconstitutional as a law granting special privileges and immunities under the
state’s equal protection clause.159 Because the trade association clause involves social and economic legislation regarding the wheat industry, the
state supreme court applied rational basis scrutiny.160 Under the rational
basis standard, a legislative classification is sustained unless it is arbitrary
and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.161
The court concluded it was not unreasonable for the legislature to classify
trade associations incorporated in the state and having as their primary purpose the representation of wheat producers from other groups for purposes
of contracting for activities related to domestic wheat policy issues, wheat
production, promotion, and sales.162 The court further concluded the legislature’s classification of trade associations bore a rational relationship to a
legitimate government interest of promoting activities related to domestic
wheat policy issues, wheat production, promotion, and sales.163 Thus, the
court held the trade association clause satisfies rational basis scrutiny and
does not violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution.164
Finally, the plaintiffs argued the trade association clause constitutes a
gift to the Grain Growers Association and the Durum Growers Association
in violation of Article X of the North Dakota Constitution, because the
statute eliminates competitive bidding and the money paid to the two
associations is unrelated to the services provided.165 Because the amount of
the final payment from collection of the wheat tax is not known when the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. ¶ 21, 749 N.W.2d at 514.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶¶ 24, 25, 749 N.W.2d at 514, 515.
Id. ¶¶ 25, 26, 749 N.W.2d at 515.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.
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contract is executed, the plaintiffs claimed there is no correlation between
the value received by the state and the funds paid by the state for the
services—thus rendering the trade association clause a gift.166 The court
stated that the statute does not contemplate a gift; rather, it contemplates a
contract for services and does not preclude competitive bidding with
entities that meet the qualifications imposed by the statute.167 The court
also noted that the state wheat commission regularly enters into written
contracts with entities qualified under the statute—contracts that identify
the services to be performed by the entity, restrict the use of funds received
from the wheat commission to the performance of those services, and
impose record-keeping and reporting requirements.168
The court went on to state that the competitive bidding process helps
ensure that the state receives a substantial benefit for its contracts and that
the successful bidders incur a detriment.169 The court determined that
although the amount of the payments under the contracts is uncertain
because the statute is based on a per bushel mill assessment, a rational
relationship exists between larger payments attributable to an increased
number of bushels of wheat and the services provided because of that
increased quantity.170 The North Dakota Supreme Court, concluding the
trade association clause is constitutional, affirmed the judgment of the
district court.171
Justice Sandstrom specially concurred.172 He disagreed to the extent
that dicta in the majority opinion could be read as suggesting that any consideration, no matter how minimal, would be sufficient to defeat the state
constitution’s prohibition on gifts.173 The state constitutional limitation on
gifts, he wrote, is the action of the people in general to restrain government
actors from gifting public funds or property; thus, private-contract consideration is not the appropriate standard to determine whether there has been a
gift of public funds.174

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. ¶ 29.
Id. ¶ 30, 749 N.W.2d at 516.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 34 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. ¶ 35, 749 N.W.2d at 517.
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CORPORATIONS—PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
AXTMANN V. CHILLEMI
In Axtmann v. Chillemi,175 Geri Chillemi, as sole shareholder, and
Michael Jon Natwick, as vice president and secretary, appealed from a
district court judgment piercing the corporate veil of Main Realty, Inc. and
voiding the assignments of real estate listings from Main Realty to
Mainland, Inc.176 The decision arose after Main Realty was unable to
satisfy a previous jury verdict imposing substantial liability on Main Realty
due to a real estate transaction concerning Thomas and Arel Axtmann.177
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to
pierce the corporate veil of Main Realty and reversed the part of the district
court’s judgment imposing liability on Mainland.178
Geri Chillemi and other individuals incorporated Main Realty, Inc. in
1985 to purchase the trade name Main and Company Realtors for $20,000
and to list and sell real estate through its agents.179 Chillemi was the sole
shareholder, president, and treasurer of Main Realty.180 Michael Jon
Natwick was the vice president and secretary of Main Realty.181 Chillemi
and Natwick resided with each other and were also partners in Mainland
Ventures Unlimited, a partnership that owned commercial property and
leased office space to Main Realty.182 Chillemi was the designated broker
at Main Realty, and office policy required its associates to sign a contract
with Chillemi to establish independent contractor status.183
Main Realty used a uniform real estate salesperson contract, which established that its agents were regarded as independent contractors.184 Under
the contract, agents received one hundred percent of any earned commissions in exchange for monthly rent and expenses paid to Main Realty.185
The contract was month-to-month and could be terminated for failure to pay
rent, which would also cause the commission to decrease to fifty percent.186
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

2007 ND 179, 740 N.W.2d 838.
Axtmann, ¶1, 740 N.W.2d at 840.
Id. ¶ 5, 740 N.W.2d at 842.
Id. ¶ 25, 740 N.W.2d at 847.
Id. ¶ 2, 740 N.W.2d at 840.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4, 740 N.W.2d at 841.
Id.
Id. at 841-42.
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Thomas and Arel Axtmann sued Main Realty and one of its agents regarding the purchase of a house.187 A jury found Main Realty and the agent
jointly and severally liable to the Axtmanns for $75,000 in economic damages.188 Both the agent and Main Realty were further found guilty of fraud
and liable for exemplary damages of $45,500 and $19,500, respectively.189
Following the Axtmann judgment, Main Realty held a special meeting
of the board of directors, which included Chillemi and Natwick.190 The minutes of this meeting stated that three of Main Realty’s agents transferred to
other companies, that the remaining rent from the other five agents was insufficient to cover the company’s cost of doing business, and that it was
impossible to find new agents to transfer to Main Realty.191 Accordingly, a
motion was carried to dissolve Main Realty and to vacate its premises.192
At this meeting, Natwick resigned as vice president and secretary of Main
Realty in order to form his own company.193 Chillemi filled those vacancies until the corporation was dissolved.194
On May 19, 2004, Natwick incorporated Mainland, Inc.195 Chillemi
subsequently signed several agreements in which Main Realty agreed to relinquish to Mainland all claims for any commissions for the sale of real estate covered by its listing contract.196 All commissions were to be paid to
Mainland, and Mainland would be responsible for the listing contract.197
Mainland did not pay Main Realty any consideration for these assignments.198 On May 28, 2004, Chillemi closed Main Realty’s bank account
and used the remaining $150.52 to pay the company’s telephone bill.199
Main Realty was then involuntarily dissolved by the North Dakota Secretary of State for failing to file an annual report.200
The Axtmanns subsequently levied on Main Realty’s property and received a mere $7.52 toward their judgment from a sheriff’s sale of office
equipment.201 The Axtmanns sued Chillemi, Natwick, Mainland, Main
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. ¶ 5, 740 N.W.2d at 842.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
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Realty, and Mainland Ventures, alleging that Main Realty fraudulently
transferred the listing agreements and interests in commissions to Mainland
for no value.202 The Axtmanns sought a declaration that Mainland was a
successor in interest to Main Realty for purposes of collecting on its prior
judgment.203 Further, the Axtmanns sought an order piercing the corporate
veil of Main Realty to impose personal liability on Natwick and Chillemi
for the company’s debts.204 The district court found that the listing contract
transfers were fraudulent under chapter 13-02.1 of the North Dakota Century Code and that Mainland was liable for the Axtmann’s judgment against
Main Realty.205 The court further pierced the corporate veil of Main Realty
and held Chillemi and Natwick personally liable for the judgment.206 On
appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Chillemi and Natwick argued
that the district court erred in piercing the corporate veil of Main Realty.207
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote for the majority in Axtmann. He began by stating that officers and directors are generally not liable for corporate debts due to the legitimate corporate principle of limited liability.208
However, when the corporate structure is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, a corporation will be regarded
as a mere “association of persons.”209 In making this determination, factors
to consider include insolvency of the corporation at the time of the transaction in question, siphoning of funds by the dominant shareholder, and the
existence of the corporation as a mere facade for individual dealings.210
Furthermore, proof of fraud is not a necessary prerequisite for piercing the
corporate veil, and there must be a degree of injustice, inequity, or fundamental unfairness.211
The standards for piercing the corporate veil are more flexible in tort
than in contract.212 Unlike contract actions, which involve an element of
choice in entering the contractual relationship, tort cases involve unexpected occurrences.213 Accordingly, in tort cases, greater significance is
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 842-43.
205. Id. ¶ 10, 740 N.W.2d at 843.
206. Id.
207. Id. ¶ 11.
208. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Hanewald v. Bryan’s, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 414, 415 (N.D. 1988), Jablonsky
v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985), and Hilzendager v. Skwarok, 335 N.W.2d 768, 774
(N.D. 1983)).
209. Id.
210. Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Jablonsky, 377 N.W.2d at 563).
211. Id.
212. Id. ¶ 14.
213. Id.
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placed on corporate undercapitalization.214 Doing corporate business without a sufficient basis of financial responsibility is an abuse of the separate
entity.215 If the organization is insufficiently capitalized when compared
with its business dealings and risk of losses and liabilities, undercapitalization becomes a ground for piercing the corporate veil.216 The burden of establishing this basis rests with the party making the claim, and the court
must make a very fact-specific inquiry.217
The district court found three grounds for piercing the corporate veil:
Main Realty was undercapitalized, it was insolvent at the time of the Axtmanns’ judgment, and it was a “pass through” corporation with no substantial assets.218 Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, the North
Dakota Supreme Court first addressed the appellants’ argument that Main
Realty was sufficiently capitalized.219 The appellants maintained that Main
Realty functioned properly for twenty years, followed corporate formalities,
and was solvent up until the Axtmanns’ judgment.220
The district court made particular findings regarding the appellants’
primary argument that it was sufficiently capitalized.221 The district court
found that after Chillemi purchased the business, there was no evidence that
additional capital was put into the business, and that it was foreseeable that
Main Realty might be liable for claims by customers, which would require
further capitalization.222 Further, the district court found that Main Realty
was insolvent at the time of the Axtmanns’ judgment, as it was unable to
pay its normal debts and it was forced to rely on Chillemi’s personal credit
to operate.223
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that although Main Realty
met all the statutory requirements of a real estate brokerage firm, it could
not use its corporate form to avoid foreseeable liabilities.224 The majority
agreed with the district court and held that the record did not reflect any
further capitalization of Main Realty for foreseeable liabilities, such as the
Axtmanns’ judgment.225 Although Main Realty’s salesperson contract

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
Id. ¶18, 740 N.W.2d at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20, 740 N.W.2d at 846.
Id.
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provides for different commission percentages in certain situations, the
record contained no evidence that Realtors were paid anything less than a
full one hundred percent commission.226 As a result, the listing agreements
assigned by Main Realty to Mainland belonged to the respective listing
agent and had no value to Main Realty, which supported the district court’s
finding that Main Realty was undercapitalized.227
The majority also recognized that Main Realty’s annual meeting minutes established that it was not realizing a profit and had outstanding credit
card debt.228 Chillemi and Natwick had used their personal commissions to
pay the debt.229 The court determined that although Main Realty may have
operated for several years, it struggled to satisfy its debt.230 This factored
into the court’s undercapitalization analysis.231
After considering Main Realty’s undercapitalization and reviewing the
record, the North Dakota Supreme Court did not hold that the district
court’s decision was clearly erroneous.232 However, the court expressly
concluded that the district court erred in holding that the listing agreement
transfers to Mainland were fraudulent.233 This conclusion was based on the
fact that the agreements had no value to Main Realty and belonged to the
respective agents.234 Therefore, Mainland should not have been liable as a
continuation of Main Realty, and the court reversed the part of the judgment
imposing liability on Mainland.235
Justice Crothers wrote a dissenting opinion in Axtmann.236 Justice
Crothers concurred with the majority’s opinion reversing the district court
imposing successor liability on Mainland, but dissented from the part of the
majority opinion affirming the district court’s piercing of Main Realty’s
corporate veil.237 Justice Crothers expressed his concern that the majority’s
holding would make piercing the corporate veil the “rule, rather than the
exception” and set dangerous precedent.238
Justice Crothers stated that categorizing a corporation as a “passthrough” corporation is not per se bad or determinative of inequity because
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. ¶ 21.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 24, 740 N.W.2d at 847.
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Id.
Id. ¶¶ 24, 25.
Id. ¶ 26 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the corporate entity is primarily used for limited liability purposes.239 It is a
legitimate and recognized reason for the corporate entity.240 Further, Main
Realty was an S corporation, which is designed to pass income through the
corporation to the owner-shareholder.241 For these reasons, Justice Crothers
believed that the majority erroneously characterized Main Realty as a “pass
through” or “shell” corporation.242
Justice Crothers also opined that the district court’s finding that Main
Realty was undercapitalized was erroneous.243 The correct application of
the law would have required examining the corporation’s capitalization at
its formation.244 Main Realty was initially capitalized with $20,000 and had
a very limited operation.245 Therefore, Justice Crothers stated the district
court erroneously concluded that Main Realty was undercapitalized or
without profits sufficient to meet its capital needs.246 Instead, the corporation’s debt should receive little or no weight in the analysis.247 Piercing
Main Realty’s corporate veil would mean that a corporation must ignore
realities of organization, finance, and taxation, and have sufficient reserve
money to pay any substantial judgment.248 Justice Crothers found this result too hostile to small businesses and inconsistent with legislative intent,
and therefore dissented.249
Justice Sandstrom wrote separately, concurring and dissenting from the
majority opinion.250 Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority’s holding that Main Realty had no interest in the listing contracts or that they had
no value.251 The listing contracts were contracts between the owner of the
property and the broker, Main Realty.252 Because under North Dakota law
the broker is entitled to receive the commission and any commitment to pay
the salesperson a commission is an unsecured obligation, the listing contracts were an asset of Main Realty.253 Therefore, according to Justice

239.
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Id. ¶ 39, 740 N.W.2d at 852.
Id.
Id.
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Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶ 42, 740 N.W.2d at 853.
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Id. ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 44.
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Id. ¶ 48, 740 N.W.2d at 854.
Id. ¶ 49
Id. ¶¶ 49, 50.
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Sandstrom, Main Realty had a claim against the value of the agreements,
and their transfers were fraudulent.254
Justice Kapsner also concurred in part and dissented in part.255 Justice
Kapsner agreed with the majority in affirming the district court’s piercing
of the corporate veil, but dissented from the majority holding that reversed
the judgment imposing liability on Mainland.256 Like Justice Sandstrom,
Justice Kapsner believed the listing agreements had value to Main Realty
because of its right to receive rent or partial commissions under them.257
The agreements were transferred without consideration while Main Realty
was insolvent.258 Justice Kapsner stated the trial court was not clearly erroneous when it found that the transfers were made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the Axtmanns.259 Therefore, Justice Kapsner dissented from
the majority’s holding that the transfers to Mainland were not fraudulent.260
Justice Kapsner also criticized the majority for failing to discuss the
independent basis of successor liability of Mainland.261 Although a
successor corporation is not generally liable for the debts of the predecessor
corporation simply due to the transfer of assets, there are exceptions.262
One such exception is when the successor corporation is a mere
continuation of the selling company.263 Justice Kapsner determined that
this exception applied to the facts of the case and thus Mainland was a
continuation of Main Realty and liable for the entire debt of Main Realty to
the Axtmanns.264
In Axtmann, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district
court was not clearly erroneous when it found that Main Realty was undercapitalized.265 Further, the court held that Main Realty acted as a “passthrough” corporation for purposes of avoiding personal liability on its
shareholders.266 The court reversed the district court’s judgment imposing
liability on Mainland because the transfers of the listing agreements had no
value and, therefore, were not fraudulent.267
254.
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CRIMINAL LAW—ENDANGERMENT OF A CHILD—APPLICATION
TO UNBORN CHILDREN
STATE V. GEISER
In State v. Geiser,268 Michelle Geiser appealed a district court order
denying her motion to dismiss the charge of endangerment of a child.269
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court erred when it applied the charge of endangerment of a child to an unborn child.270 The
court reversed and remanded to allow Geiser the opportunity to withdraw
her guilty plea to the child endangerment charge.271
Geiser allegedly overdosed on prescription drugs when she was twenty-nine weeks pregnant.272 The State asserted that the overdose led to the
demise of Geiser’s unborn child, and charged her with possession of a controlled substance, ingesting a controlled substance, and endangerment of a
child or vulnerable adult in violation of section 19-03.1-22.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code.273
Geiser filed a motion to dismiss the charge of endangerment of a child
or vulnerable adult, asserting that the term “child” applied to individuals
under the age of eighteen and did not include unborn children.274 The district court denied the motion, relying on Hopkins v. McBane,275 in which the
North Dakota Supreme Court held a wrongful-death action could be
brought against one whose tortious conduct causes the death of a viable unborn child.276 The district court also relied on Whitner v. South Carolina,277
in which the South Carolina Supreme Court determined a viable fetus was a
person for the purpose of a statute against child abuse, the minority view
opinion.278 Geiser entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of child
268. 2009 ND 36, 763 N.W.2d 469.
269. Geiser, ¶ 1, 763 N.W.2d at 470.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. ¶ 2.
273. Id. ¶ 3. Section 19-03.1-22.2 of the North Dakota Century Code states, “[A] person
who knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or vulnerable adult to be exposed to, to
ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection 1, is guilty of a class C felony.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.122.2(2).
274. Geiser, ¶ 4, 763 N.W.2d at 470.
275 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984).
276. Geiser, ¶ 5, 763 N.W.2d at 470 (citing Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 865 (N.D.
1984)).
277. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
278. Geiser, ¶ 5, 763 N.W.2d at 470 (citing Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780
(S.C. 1997)).
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endangerment, reserving her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her
motion to dismiss.279
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the denial.280 The court
began by noting that the issue of whether the charge of endangerment of a
child applies to an unborn child is one of statutory interpretation, a question
of law that is fully reviewable on appeal.281 Section 19-03.1-22.2(1)(b) of
the North Dakota Century Code states that for the purposes of the child endangerment section, “child” is defined as “an individual who is under the
age of eighteen years.”282 When interpreting statutes, the court stated, it has
a duty to ascertain the legislature’s intent.283 The court construes the words
of a statute in their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood sense.284 Because the State advocated an expansive interpretation of “child” to include
unborn children, the court reviewed extrinsic evidence to further interpret
and construe the statute and to determine whether the State’s interpretation
was consistent with legislative intent.285
The first extrinsic evidence the court examined was legislative
history.286 The legislative history of section 19-03.1-22.2 did not indicate
that the state legislature intended the statute to apply to unborn children.287
The legislative history did explain that the law was modeled after a Utah
statute, but neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court of
Utah has analyzed whether the Utah statute applies to an unborn child.288
The court next looked to the Code itself.289 Section 14-10-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code states, “Minors are persons under eighteen
years of age. In this code, unless otherwise specified, the term ‘child’
means ‘minor.’ Age must be calculated from the first minute of the day on
which persons are born to the same minute of the corresponding day completing the period of minority.”290 Thus, the court stated, whether the legislature used “child” or “minor” is irrelevant, because the terms are equivalent under the Code.291 Additionally, the court stated, the legislature
279. Id.
280. Id. ¶ 1.
281. Id. ¶ 6 (citing Grey Bear v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2002 ND 139, ¶ 7, 651
N.W.2d 611).
282. Id. ¶ 7, 763 N.W.2d at 471 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-22.2(1)(b)).
283. Id. ¶ 8.
284. Id.
285. Id. ¶ 9.
286. Id. ¶ 10.
287. Id.
288. Id. ¶ 11.
289. Id. ¶ 12, 763 N.W.2d at 472.
290. Id. ¶ 13 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-01).
291. Id.
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provided that the age of a child is calculated from the day on which the
child is born, and thus an unborn child is neither a child nor a minor.292
The court next distinguished Hopkins from the case at hand.293 In
Hopkins, the court held that North Dakota’s wrongful-death statute authorized a claim to be brought against one whose tortious conduct caused the
death of a viable unborn child—thus, an unborn child has rights against a
third party in a wrongful-death action.294 However, the court stated,
Hopkins does not necessarily imply that an unborn child has rights against
the mother.295 In Hopkins, the statute interpreted was remedial, and thus the
court construed it liberally.296 The child endangerment statute, by contrast,
is criminal, and criminal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the defendant and against the government.297
Additionally, following Hopkins, the legislature enacted chapter 12.117.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, which recognized the rights of unborn children against actions of third parties.298 This, the court stated,
makes it clear that when the legislature intends to cover unborn children, it
does so expressly.299 Chapter 12.1-17.1 makes it a crime for a person to
commit several acts (such as murder and assault) against an unborn child,
but the legislature determined that for purposes of that statute, “person”
does not include the pregnant woman.300 Thus, the mother of an unborn
child cannot be charged with a crime against her unborn child under chapter
12.1-17.1.301
Therefore, the court stated, its holding that a pregnant woman cannot
be charged for a crime allegedly committed against her unborn child under
section 19-03.1-22.2(1)(b) coincides with both Hopkins and chapter 12.117.1.302 The court concluded by holding section 19-03.1-22.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code does not apply to an unborn child.303 The court reversed and remanded the district court order to allow Geiser an opportunity
to withdraw her guilty plea to the charge of endangerment of a child.304
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Id. ¶ 15, 763 N.W.2d at 472.
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Justice Sandstrom specially concurred.305 He agreed with the majority
that the conviction must be set aside, writing that under the separation of
powers system, it is not the role of the court to criminalize what the legislature has not clearly made criminal.306 He disagreed, however, with the majority that the court should rely on section 14-10-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code for its definition of a “child.”307 The introductory language
of that section, he wrote, specifically provides that it applies only if no other
definition is supplied.308 In the case at hand, section 19-03.1-22.2 provides
that “‘child’ means an individual who is under the age of eighteen years.”309
Justice Sandstrom further stated that extensive review of the legislative
history of section 19-03.1-22.2 reflected no discussion of the application of
that statute to unborn children.310 Additionally, the legislature specifically
excluded the mother from the application of section 12.1-17.1-01(2), the
statute relating to conduct causing the death of an unborn child.311
Justice Sandstrom then noted that the great majority of states which
have decided the issue at hand have determined that similar statutes do not
apply to unborn children.312 He concluded that lenity requires deference to
the accused when the scope of a statute does not clearly apply, and agreed
that the criminal judgment must be reversed.313
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Id. ¶ 23 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id.
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-22.2).
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01(2)).
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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCH AND SEIZURE—GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
STATE V. LUNDE
In State v. Lunde,314 Marcus Lunde appealed from a criminal judgment
entered upon his conditional plea of guilty to possession of marijuana with
intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance, and two counts of
possession of drug paraphernalia.315 The North Dakota Supreme Court,
holding that the district court erred in applying the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule, reversed and remanded to allow Lunde to withdraw
his guilty plea.316
In August 2006, a magistrate found probable cause existed and issued a
search warrant for Lunde’s West Fargo apartment, based on an application
and affidavit submitted by Officer Jason Hicks of the West Fargo Police
Department.317 In his affidavit, Officer Hicks detailed information he had
received from other law enforcement officials.318 The affidavit stated that
on August 3, 2006, Officer Hicks had spoken with Special Agent Donald
Burns of the Central Minnesota Drug Task Force.319 Burns told Officer
Hicks that he and Detective Chuck Anderson of the Clay County Sheriff’s
Department had spoken to a confidential informant whose name and identity were known to both Burns and Anderson.320 The confidential informant
told Burns and Anderson that the informant had associated with two individuals in a drug trafficking organization, one of whom was a suspect in a
federal narcotics case in Minnesota and another who was known as
“Slim.”321 The informant later identified Slim as Lunde.322 The informant
also told Burns and Anderson that he had met with Slim in the parking lot
of Slim’s West Fargo apartment, where the informant said he transferred
money gram receipts from drug transactions to and from Slim.323 The informant stated that Slim was involved in selling marijuana and methamphetamine, that the informant often collected drug debts and kept a debt ledger
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317.
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320.
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2008 ND 142, 752 N.W.2d 630.
Lunde, ¶ 1, 752 N.W.2d at 632.
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Id. ¶¶ 2, 7, 752 N.W.2d at 632-33.
Id. ¶ 2, 752 N.W.2d at 632.
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Id. at 632-33.
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for Slim, and that the informant would return the money collected to Slim’s
apartment.324
Officer Hicks’ affidavit went on to state that on August 2, 2006, he had
spoken with Anderson, because Anderson was attempting to identify
Slim.325 Officer Hicks had information about a person who might be
Slim—on July 21, 2006, the West Fargo Police Department assisted the
Moorhead Police Department in attempting to locate “CJ,” and a Moorhead
Police Department detective had received an anonymous tip that CJ was
staying with Lunde at his apartment in West Fargo.326 The affidavit stated
that Lunde allowed the officers to check the apartment for CJ and that
Lunde told officers he had not seen CJ since July 16, 2006.327
The affidavit also stated that on July 20, 2006, Burns had conducted an
interview of a “cooperating individual” who was “fully identified” by
Burns, but who wished to remain anonymous.328 According to the affidavit,
the cooperating individual had lived with a person who associated with
Slim and believed Slim to be involved in trafficking controlled substances.329 Also according to the affidavit, Burns reviewed the electronic
telephone listing of a cellular telephone taken from a suspect in a large federal narcotics case at the time of his arrest.330 The listing included a cell
phone number for Slim.331
On the basis of Officer Hicks’ affidavit, the magistrate found probable
cause and issued a search warrant for Lunde’s apartment.332 On August 3,
2006, Lunde was charged with various drug crimes as a result of the search
warrant’s execution.333 In January 2007, Lunde moved the district court to
suppress the evidence from his residence, contending that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and Article 1, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution.334
The district court denied the motion, holding that while there was no probable cause for the search warrant, the good faith exception applied.335
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In May 2007, Lunde entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.336 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed and remanded to allow Lunde to withdraw his
guilty plea, finding the district court erred in applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.337
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that it
will reverse a district court’s denial of a suppression motion where the decision lacks sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting its
findings, and where the decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence.338 Whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant is a
question of law, and thus fully reviewable on appeal.339
The court, viewing the totality of the circumstances and not looking
beyond the four corners of the affidavit, agreed with the district court that
probable cause did not exist to support the issuance of the search warrant
for Lunde’s apartment.340 However, the court found insufficient competent
evidence existed to support the district court’s decision that a good faith exception applied to the state’s exclusionary rule.341
In arriving at its conclusion, the court first stated that it has not yet decided whether North Dakota’s constitution precludes recognition of the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.342 Generally, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence that is seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.343 Various exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply, however, including the good faith exception, recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Leon.344 Under the good faith exception, evidence
is not excluded when an officer has acted in good faith upon objectively
reasonable reliance on the issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination.345
In State v. Herrick,346 the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized four
situations in which the good faith exception does not apply, because an officer’s reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable: (1) when the is336.
337.
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341.
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346.
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Id. ¶ 1, 752 N.W.2d at 632.
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suing magistrate was misled by false information intentionally or negligently given by the affiant; (2) when the magistrate totally abandoned her
cial role and failed to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the
warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as
to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when
a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially deficient
warrant.347 In Herrick, the court applied the Leon good faith exception to a
statutory violation of the North Dakota Century Code.348 Because the issue
before the court in Herrick was a statutory violation, rather than a violation
of the state constitution, the court did not rule on whether the state recognizes a good faith exception to North Dakota’s exclusionary rule.349
In Lunde, the court continued to leave the question open, holding that
insufficient competent evidence existed to support the district court’s decision that a good faith exception applied.350 Thus, the court did not address
whether North Dakota’s constitution precludes recognition of a good faith
exception to the state’s exclusionary rule.351 The court held that Officer
Hicks’s affidavit supplied merely a tenuous and conclusory suggestion that
Lunde was involved in criminal activity.352 Furthermore, the court stated,
the warrant was based upon stale information from an uncorroborated confidential informant who was part of the criminal milieu.353 The affidavit
failed to establish a fair probability that evidence would be found in the
places to be searched.354
Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the good
faith exception did not apply, the court did not address whether North Dakota’s constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
precludes recognition of the good faith exception to the state’s exclusionary
rule.355 The court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded to the district court to permit Lunde to withdraw his conditional guilty plea.356
Justice Sandstrom dissented.357 He wrote that probable cause was
established; there is a good faith exception under the North Dakota
Constitution; and, if there was not probable cause for the issuance of the
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
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search warrant, there was substantial indicia of probable cause and good
faith reliance on the warrant by law enforcement—thus the good faith
exception would apply.358
Justice Crothers also dissented.359 While he agreed with Justice
Sandstrom that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule exists under
the North Dakota Constitution and that it applied in Lunde, he did not agree
that the search was supported by probable cause.360

358. Id. ¶ 32.
359. Id. ¶ 40, 752 N.W.2d at 640 (Crothers, J., dissenting).
360. Id. ¶ 41.
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CRIMINAL LAW—WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS—
ESTABLISHING A FAIR AND JUST REASON
STATE V. LIUM
In State v. Lium,361 Travis Lium appealed a district court order on remand denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.362 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion when it held that Lium failed to establish a fair and just reason to allow
him to withdraw his guilty plea.363
Lium was charged with attempted murder, a class A felony, in June
2006.364 In February 2007, under a written plea agreement, he entered
Alford pleas to one count of aggravated assault and one count of reckless
endangerment, both class C felonies.365 The plea agreement stated that the
State would ask the district court to impose a five-year sentence for each
charge, with the time to be served consecutively.366 Also under the plea
agreement, Lium could argue for a lesser sentence, but for no less
incarceration than seven and a half years.367
At Lium’s change-of-plea hearing, the district court informed Lium
that he would waive his rights by pleading guilty.368 The district court also
confirmed that Lium understood the plea agreement and the elements of the
charges against him and that Lium had reviewed the plea agreement with
his attorney.369 Furthermore, Lium stated that no threats had been made to
induce him to enter the plea.370 The district court then accepted Lium’s
guilty pleas and ordered a presentence investigation.371
On February 23, 2007, Lium wrote a letter to the district court, stating
that he wanted to rescind his earlier pleas and that he wanted either a new
attorney or perhaps to represent himself.372 Before sentencing, Lium obtained new counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea.373 He claimed
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that his former attorney had threatened to withdraw if he did not plead
guilty, that he was innocent, and that he had a defense to the charges.374
The district court denied Lium’s motion to withdraw his pleas, concluding
that the pleas were voluntary and intelligent and that withdrawal was not
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.375 Lium appealed to the North
Dakota Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the district court to determine whether a fair and just reason existed to allow Lium to withdraw
his pleas.376
On remand, based on a review of the file, transcript, counsels’ arguments and motions, and Lium’s supporting affidavit, the district court again
denied Lium’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.377 The district court
concluded that Lium failed to establish a fair and just reason to allow withdrawal.378
Lium appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, contending four
fair and just reasons existed to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea—that
he asserted his innocence through his post-plea district court filings and the
nature of his Alford plea; that he asserted a legal defense to the charge when
he informed the district court he was defending himself; that he informed
the district court that his plea was coerced; and that he informed the district
court that his prior attorney had given ineffective assistance of counsel.379
In its analysis, the North Dakota Supreme Court first laid out Rule
32(d) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs the
withdrawal of a guilty plea.380 Under that rule, after a guilty plea is accepted, but before sentencing (such as in Lium’s case), the defendant may
withdraw a guilty plea if necessary to correct a manifest injustice or, if allowed in the court’s discretion, for any fair and just reason, unless the prosecution has been prejudiced by reliance on the plea.381 The court went on to
state that the “fair and just” reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea involves
a lesser showing than is required to establish “manifest injustice.”382
Rule 32(d) is meant to be construed liberally in favor of the defendant,
but withdrawal is not a matter of right.383 Once a defendant establishes a
fair and just reason, the burden shifts to the State to establish that it would
374.
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be prejudiced by granting leave to withdraw.384 The North Dakota Supreme
Court will not reverse the district court’s determination of whether a fair
and just reason exists, unless the district court abuses its discretion.385
The state supreme court recognized that the fair and just reason
standard is not well understood.386 Thus, the court laid out nine factors that
a district court may consider in determining whether a fair and just reason
exists to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing: (1) the amount of time
that has passed between the entry of the plea and the motion to withdraw;
(2) defendant’s assertion of innocence or a legally cognizable defense to the
charge; (3) prejudice to the government; (4) whether the plea was knowing
and voluntary; (5) whether the plea was made in compliance with Rule 11
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure; (6) whether adequate
assistance of counsel was available to the defendant; (7) the plausibility of
the reason for seeking to withdraw; (8) whether a plea withdrawal would
waste judicial resources; and (9) whether the parties reached or breached a
plea agreement.387 The factors are not an exclusive list, however, and other
factors, depending on the circumstances, may be relevant.388
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Lium’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
as it made specific findings on Lium’s assertion of innocence, his assertion
of a legal defense to the charge, the knowing and voluntary nature of his
plea, the quality of the legal assistance he received, and the benefit he received from entering the plea agreement.389 The court went through each of
the four factors in turn.
First, the district court reviewed the record and made a credibility determination that Lium did not attempt to withdraw his guilty plea because
he was innocent, but rather because he wanted a less severe penalty.390 The
North Dakota Supreme Court stated it would not second-guess the district
court’s credibility determinations or re-weigh the evidence, and thus the
district court did not err in finding Lium did not adequately assert his innocence.391
Second, the district court found Lium did not adequately raise a legal
defense.392 While Lium contended on appeal that he was acting in self384.
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defense when he stabbed the victim, he did not argue such a claim in the
brief in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the accompanying
affidavit, or at the hearing for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.393 Instead, he asserted the claim of self-defense only in a post-plea letter to the
court.394 Thus, the state supreme court held the record supported the district
court’s finding that Lium did not raise any legal defenses.395
Third, the district court found Lium was not coerced into pleading
guilty, but rather voluntarily pled guilty to the lesser charges.396 The North
Dakota Supreme Court found the district court reasonably concluded, based
on the evidence and the defendant’s demeanor, that Lium took the plea
agreement not because he felt threatened by his attorney, but rather to avoid
a greater penalty.397 Thus, the state supreme court held the district court did
not err in its finding.398
Fourth and finally, the district court found unsupported Lium’s claim
that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel.399 The district
court concluded, based on the record, that the counsel Lium received was
“to his benefit,” that he was represented by “seasoned counsel,” and that the
reduced charges negotiated by his attorneys greatly reduced the potential
time of incarceration.400 Thus, Lium neither demonstrated that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness nor
demonstrated that, but for the unprofessionalism, the result of the proceeding would have been different.401 The state supreme court held that the district court did not err in its determination that Lium failed to establish that
his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.402
Based on the four factors above, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Lium did not establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing his
plea.403 It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Lium’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and thus affirmed the district
court’s order.404
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FAMILY LAW—DIVORCE—REHABILITATIVE SPOUSAL SUPPORT
SOLEM V. SOLEM
In Solem v. Solem,405 the North Dakota Supreme Court held the fact
that an award of rehabilitative spousal support is to last longer than the
length of the marriage does not, alone, indicate the award is clearly erroneous.406 In Solem, Scott Solem appealed a divorce judgment awarding Erica
Solem spousal support.407
Scott Solem argued that the trial court’s award of spousal support to
Erica Solem was clearly erroneous as to amount and duration.408 The North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that the trial court properly analyzed the RuffFischer guidelines, which are applied when one party is required to pay
spousal support to the other party, in its judgment.409 The trial court examined the parties’ ages, earning abilities, needs, physical health, and the
length of the marriage.410 The trial court also awarded Scott Solem more
assets, which would help him retain his greater earning capacity, but less
net equity.411 The trial court did not specifically address the conduct of the
parties, but the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that trial courts are not
required to make a specific finding on each factor.412
Scott Solem also contended that the trial court did not have a basis for
awarding spousal support for ten years, as the duration of the marriage was
nine years.413 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that while there
must be some factual basis in the record for the length of time support is
awarded, a trial court is not required to articulate why it awards spousal
support for a specific length of time.414 The court concluded there was a
factual basis in the record for the ten-year duration of spousal support, and
held the fact that the award of rehabilitative spousal support was to last
longer than the length of the marriage did not, alone, indicate the award was
clearly erroneous.415
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The state supreme court also concluded that while the division of property was not equal, it was equitable, and the trial court explained the disparity.416 Thus, the trial court’s spousal support determination was not
clearly erroneous, even considering the unequal distribution of property.417
Finally, the court concluded evidence established Erica Solem proved her
standard of living at trial, thus supporting the trial court’s determination of
spousal support.418
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding the fact that an
award of rehabilitative spousal support is to last longer than the length of
the marriage does not, alone, indicate the award is clearly erroneous.419
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FAMILY LAW—DIVORCE—SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
KELLY V. KELLY
In Kelly v. Kelly,420 Richard Kelly appealed a district court judgment
granting him a divorce from Karol Kelly, but concluding that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the incidents of the marriage.421 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
the district court had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the tribal
court to adjudicate the incidents of the marriage.422
Richard Kelly sought a divorce from Karol Kelly in state district
court.423 Richard Kelly is a non-Indian.424 Karol Kelly and G.K., the parties’ daughter, are enrolled members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, and
Karol Kelly owned non-trust farm and ranch land on the Standing Rock
Reservation.425 Richard and Karol Kelly married in Las Vegas, Nevada.426
Their daughter was conceived and born off of the reservation.427 The family lived together on the reservation until Richard Kelly left the home and
moved to Bismarck.428 Richard Kelly commenced a divorce action in state
court in December 2006.429 Karol Kelly answered and filed a counterclaim,
requesting that she be granted a divorce, that she receive child custody,
child support, spousal support, and attorney fees, and that the court make an
equitable division of property.430 Richard Kelly contended the parties attempted to reconcile, and Karol Kelly and their daughter lived with him in
Bismarck from March through June of 2007.431
In December 2007, the district court awarded Richard Kelly holiday
visitation with G.K.432 In January 2008, Karol Kelly commenced a separate
divorce action in tribal court and served a motion in the pending state court
action seeking dismissal of that action based on a lack of subject matter
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jurisdiction.433 She asserted for the first time that the tribal court had
exclusive jurisdiction in the matter.434
The district court first held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and
dismissed the action in its entirety.435 After Richard Kelly filed a motion
for reconsideration, however, the district court issued an Order Upon Reconsideration, holding it had jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage but lacked
jurisdiction over the incidents of the marriage.436 The district court then
granted Richard Kelly a divorce from Karol Kelly, but dismissed the rest of
the action.437
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that state court jurisdiction
over certain claims is prohibited if it would “undermine the authority of the
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right
of the Indians to govern themselves.”438 The court also noted that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which creates exclusive jurisdiction in the
tribal court for certain child custody proceedings involving an Indian child,
does not apply to an award of custody to a parent in a divorce proceeding.439 The exclusion, the court stated, recognizes the concurrent jurisdiction of state and tribal courts in such cases.440
The court distinguished Byzewski v. Byzewski,441 which concluded that
the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over child custody and support in
a state divorce action infringed on the right of the reservation Indians to
make and be ruled by their own laws.442 The court held the case at hand
differed from Byzewski in two main areas.443 First, the court stated that under the current case, many critical incidents of the marriage occurred off the
reservation, such as where the marriage occurred, where the child was conceived and born, where Richard Kelly moved while the marriage was still
ongoing, and where the parties owned property and a business.444 Second,
the court noted that under the current case, the state court action was first in

433. Id.
434. Id. at 722-23.
435. Id. ¶ 7, 759 N.W.2d at 723.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. ¶ 11, 759 N.W.2d at 724 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
439. Id. ¶ 12.
440. Id.
441 429 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1988).
442. Kelly, ¶¶ 13-14, 759 N.W.2d at 724-25 (citing Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d 394
(N.D. 1988)).
443. Id. ¶ 16, 759 N.W.2d at 725.
444. Id.
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time and had been ongoing for more than a year when Karol Kelly first attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the tribal court.445
The North Dakota Supreme Court also recognized that the state, as well
as the tribe, has a significant interest in cases involving family issues and
child welfare.446 In cases with off-reservation impact or cases that occur off
of the reservation, state courts thus have concurrent jurisdiction with tribal
courts.447 The court held that numerous factors supported the district
court’s authority to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.448
The district court was also required, however, to apply the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) when determining jurisdiction of the child custody issue.449 On remand, then, the state
supreme court directed the district court to give the parties an opportunity to
present evidence relevant to the jurisdictional facts and to determine whether the state, the reservation, or neither was the child’s home state for purposes of UCCJEA analysis.450
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded by stating the district
court erred in determining it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
the incidents of the marriage.451 It reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.452
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PARTNERSHIPS—LIMITED PARTNER RIGHTS AND DUTIES
RED RIVER WINGS, INC. V. HOOT, INC.
In Red River Wings, Inc. v. Hoot, Inc.,453 the majority limited partners
in two limited partnerships appealed from a judgment awarding damages
and attorney fees to the minority of the limited partners.454 The majority
partners also appealed the district court’s dismissal of the majority’s claims
against persons and entities involved in a business dispute over two Hooters
franchise restaurants in Canada.455 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the partnerships were dissolved ninety days after removing the general partner of both partnerships.456 The
court also affirmed the district court’s holding that the majority partners
were liable for breach of fiduciary duties.457 The court reversed and remanded for proper determination of damages, including prejudgment interest against the company providing management services to the partnerships.458 Finally, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
management company’s counterclaim for intentional interference with contractual relations.459
In the mid-1990s, Thomas Lavelle, a Fargo restaurant manager, was
informed of a series of potential business ventures when Hooters of
America sought to expand into Canada.460 Lavelle entered into a franchise
agreement with Hooters of America to establish a Hooters restaurant in
Edmonton, Alberta, along with purchase options for future Canadian
restaurants.461 Canadian Wings Investment Limited Partnership (Canadian
Wings) was formed to finance and organize the Edmonton restaurant
venture.462 Lavelle operated under Red River Wings, Inc. (Red River
Wings) as general partner of Canadian Wings.463 Lavelle, as sole
shareholder of LTM, Ltd. (LTM), also provided management services for
the restaurant.464 Ownership units of Canadian Wings were sold to various
453.
454.
455.
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457.
458.
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464.
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investors, including ME Investments, LLP (ME Investments).465 Louis
Emerson and Arthur Stern received fees and profits-only interests as special
limited partners for their services in the endeavor.466 Lavelle borrowed
money to construct the Edmonton Hooters restaurant and the limited
partners received healthy returns.467
Shortly after the Edmonton restaurant was finished, Lavelle undertook
to establish a second Hooters restaurant in Winnipeg, Manitoba.468 This
venture was structured in the same manner as the Edmonton restaurant,
with Manitoba Wings Investment Limited Partnership (Manitoba Wings)
obtaining ownership of the establishment.469 Emerson and Stern received
similar profits-only interests and many of the same investors joined, including ME Investments.470 The investors received lower returns from the
Winnipeg restaurant.471
By early 1998, Lavelle’s business relationship with Stern, Emerson,
and ME Investments began to deteriorate due to alleged poor management
by Lavelle and the lower-than-expected returns from the Winnipeg restaurant.472 In May 1998, ME Investments, Stern, Emerson, and other majority
limited partners met to address their concerns.473 After no wrongdoing was
discovered, the majority limited partners nevertheless decided to take over
management of the two partnerships and sought to remove Red River
Wings as general partner.474
In October 1998, the majority limited partners, without notice to the
minority partners, removed Red River Wings as the general partner of both
partnerships.475 Hoot, Inc. (Hoot) was formed to take over as general partner.476 The majority partners also terminated the management contracts
with LTM.477 Although Lavelle offered to alter the distribution allocations
in favor of the majority partners and despite protests by the minority limited
partners, the takeover was completed.478 Stern and Emerson proceeded to
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physically take control of the two restaurants, with expenses paid by the
partnerships.479
The majority partners sued Lavelle, Red River Wings, LTM, and others
in federal court, seeking damages.480 The suit was dismissed, without
prejudice, after two years of litigation and $350,000 in fees and costs.481
Despite the objections of the minority partners, the majority partners voted
to continue the lawsuit against Lavelle as a partnership claim and for the
partnerships to assume the costs of the litigation.482 The minority partners
then successfully obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent the
majority partners from taking the funds from the partnership.483 After a
receiver was appointed for both partnerships, Hooters of America
demanded that Lavelle be involved in the franchise.484 The majority
partners refused to compromise, and Hooters of America terminated the
franchises and issued them to Lavelle personally.485 The remaining assets
of the partnerships were then liquidated and sold at a judicially approved
sale to Lavelle.486
The minority limited partners sued the majority limited partners derivatively and individually for breach of the partnership agreements and breach
of fiduciary duties, and sought dissolution and accounting of the partnerships.487 The majority limited partners refiled their dismissed federal court
action against Red River Wings, Lavelle, and LTM in state court.488 Lavelle, through Red River Wings, also sued Hoot for damages for wrongfully
withholding distributions.489 The cases were consolidated, and the district
court awarded damages to the minority partners and Lavelle for breach of
fiduciary duties and awarded partial attorney fees.490 The majority group’s
claims were dismissed, and LTM and Lavelle were awarded damages for
services provided prior to the takeover.491
The first issue the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed was whether
the district court erred in holding as a matter of law that Canadian Wings
and Manitoba Wings were dissolved when the majority partners voted to
479.
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481.
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remove Red River Wings as general partner.492 Under the terms of the
partnership agreements, the general partner could be removed, with or
without cause, by a vote of fifty-one percent of the limited partners.493
However, the agreement only provided for the appointment of a successor
general partner in the event of resignation, dissolution, or bankruptcy of the
general partner, not in the case of removal.494 The Supreme Court held that
although the majority partners had authority to remove Red River Wings as
general partner, the agreements did not address the appointment of a successor in doing so.495
Under the statute in effect at the time, after removal of a general partner, the limited partners had ninety days to unanimously appoint a successor general partner.496 Failure to do so resulted in statutory dissolution.497
The court held that the agreements and law in effect at the time were clear
and unambiguous.498 Since there was no unanimous written consent of all
limited partners within ninety days to appoint a new general partner, the
partnerships were dissolved.499 The court affirmed the district court’s holding of dissolution, but determined that it had erred in placing the date of
dissolution as October 25, 1998.500 Instead, the dissolution occurred when
the ninety-day period expired on January 23, 1999.501
The court next turned to the majority partners’ arguments that the district court erred in finding them liable for breach of fiduciary duties.502 The
majority partners first argued that they could not be held liable in this case
because under the statute in effect at the time, a limited partner could not be
liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless the limited partner
participated in the control of the business.503 In rejecting this argument, the
court contrasted obligations owed to the partnership with fiduciary duties.504 The court held that the statutory fiduciary duties imposed on part-

492. Id. ¶ 15.
493. Id. ¶ 17, 751 N.W.2d at 216.
494. Id.
495. Id. ¶ 18, 751 N.W.2d at 216-17.
496. Id. ¶ 19, 751 N.W.2d at 217 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-10.1-26(3) (2003) (repealed 2005)).
497. Id.
498. Id. ¶ 20.
499. Id.
500. Id.
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502. Id. ¶ 22, 751 N.W.2d at 217-18.
503. Id. ¶ 23, 751 N.W.2d at 218 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-10.1-22(1) (2003) (repealed 2005)).
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ners are the duties of loyalty and care and the obligations of good faith and
fair dealing.505
The court next addressed whether the majority limited partners
breached their fiduciary duties.506 Specifically, the district court found that
the majority limited partners breached fiduciary duties when they attempted
to take over the businesses and install Hoot as general partner.507 The Supreme Court reviewed the record and held that the district court’s holding
was not clearly erroneous.508 The evidence showed that the majority group
planned a takeover and proceeded in a reckless manner.509 Specifically, the
majority limited partners ignored their attorneys’ advice to obtain unanimous consent for the appointment of a new general partner, failed to obtain
consent and give notice to Hooters of America to replace Red River Wings,
hired two replacement management companies without notice or vote, directly controlled Hoot and the partnerships, and refused to surrender control
to the court-appointed receiver.510 The court, therefore, upheld the district
court’s findings that the majority group took control and dominated the
partnerships for their own interests and violated their fiduciary duties.511
The court further held that the district court did not err in holding Kesselring and Leno individually responsible.512 The court explained that the
“limited partnership veils” of Canadian Wings and Manitoba Wings did not
need to be “pierced” in order to hold them individually liable.513 Similar to
shareholders in a close corporation, majority limited partners who controlled or acted in concert with the general partner can be held personally
liable for damages and breach of fiduciary duties.514 Furthermore, since
Emerson, Stern, and ME Investments, through Kesselring and Leno, participated in the takeover, the district court did not err in finding that ME Investments was a mere alter ego of Kesselring and Leno.515 The court applied the principle for piercing a corporate veil that if unity of interest and
ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner make the entity
nonexistent, the corporate structure is abandoned.516 Given the evidence of
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Kesselring and Leno’s level of participation in the takeover, the district
court did not err in holding them personally liable.517
The Supreme Court also upheld the district court’s finding that
Kesselring and Leno’s actions were not protected by the business judgment
rule, because they acted recklessly, with bad faith, and to further the
majority group’s own interests.518 The business judgment rule prohibits
judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and
with honest judgment to further corporate purposes.519 The rule does not
protect self-dealing, willful misconduct, or gross negligence.520 The
evidence showed the majority partners acted recklessly in installing Hoot as
the general partner without unanimous consent.521 The majority group
acted in bad faith by failing to relinquish control to the receiver and by
concocting reasons for removing Red River Wings and terminating the
contracts with LTM after the fact in order to justify their actions.522 Since
these actions were taken for the self-interest of the majority partners, the
district court did not err in rejecting their business judgment rule
argument.523
The Supreme Court next addressed the majority group’s contention that
the district court erred in dismissing their claims against Lavelle and Red
River Wings for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and fraud.524
Among the majority partners contentions were that Lavelle and Red River
Wings plundered partnership property and opportunities, wrongfully inflated compensation, made an unapproved advance to an unrelated restaurant, comingled funds, and took advantage of the partners in bad faith by
usurping profits.525 The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that
there was no credible evidence to support these claims.526 Instead, the
record contained evidence that the partnership funds were accounted for and
used for the benefit of partnership purposes.527 The court made it clear that
the task of weighing the evidence and judging credibility of witnesses fell

517. Id.
518. Id. ¶ 37, 751 N.W.2d at 222.
519. Id. ¶ 36, 751 N.W.2d at 221-22 (quoting In re Conservatorship of Sickles, 518 N.W.2d
673, 681 (N.D. 1994)).
520. Id., 751 N.W.2d at 222 (quoting Sickles, 518 N.W.2d at 680-81).
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526. Id. ¶ 40, 751 N.W.2d at 223.
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on the trier of fact, and that it is not the role of the reviewing court to reweigh credibility or resolve conflicts in the evidence.528
The court then turned to the district court’s calculation of damages.529
The district court awarded derivative damages based on an analysis by the
minority group’s expert who calculated the reasonable profits and distributions that could have been realized absent the breach of fiduciary duties and
dissolution.530 This calculation was based on prior performance of the partnerships, projected profits, and the value of the partnerships as of the date
of the takeover.531 The Supreme Court stressed that recoverable damages
include the value of the profits which would have otherwise been received,
including anticipated profits.532 Further, a reviewing court will not reverse
an award of damages unless it is clearly erroneous or outside the range of
the evidence presented.533 The court determined the method used to determine damages for lost profits was neither unreasonable nor speculative.534
However, since it previously concluded that the date of dissolution was
January 23, 1999, rather than October 25, 1998, the court reversed and remanded in order to calculate damages according to the later date.535 The
court also summarily affirmed the district court’s award of distributions to
Red River Wings from Hoot, because Red River Wings did not fulfill its
obligation under the partnership agreements to contribute one percent of the
total capital raised by the partnerships.536
The district court awarded the minority limited partners $104,130 in attorney fees.537 Although the minority group requested $222,734, the district
court disallowed any attorney fees accumulated before the case was filed on
September 26, 2002.538 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed and
recognized that the derivative claims in the matter were intertwined with
other asserted claims.539 Because not all of the efforts were directly or indirectly related to the derivative matters, the court determined that these fees,
along with duplicative and unreasonable efforts, were not recoverable, and
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the award.540
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The Supreme Court of North Dakota next addressed LTM’s argument
that the district court erred in dismissing its counterclaim against the majority group for terminating its management contracts with Canadian Wings
and Manitoba Wings.541 LTM asserted intentional interference with its contractual relationship.542 This required LTM to prove that the contracts were
breached and that the majority group instigated the breaches without justification.543 The management agreements between LTM and the two partnerships provided for termination only with cause constituting fraud, felonious
conduct, dishonesty, willful misconduct, gross negligence, or material
breach of the agreement.544 The district court found that the reasons put
forth by the majority partners for terminating the agreements were concocted from information received after termination and that no cause existed.545 However, the lower court dismissed LTM’s counterclaim, reasoning the dissolution destroyed the objective of the management contracts.546
The Supreme Court found that neither the doctrine of frustration of
purpose nor the doctrine of impossibility applied, because the frustration or
impossibility was caused by the majority group.547 Just as a party to a
contract who causes frustration or impossibility cannot rely on the doctrines
as defenses to a breach of contract, third parties who cause the frustration or
impossibility cannot rely on the defenses in an action for intentional
interference with a contractual relationship.548 Therefore, since the majority
limited partners caused the dissolution of the partnerships, the dissolution
could not be used as a defense to LTM’s counterclaim.549 The state
supreme court reversed the district court’s dismissal of LTM’s counterclaim
and remanded for findings on whether the majority group should be liable
for damages for intentional interference with the contract.550
The final issue presented to the court was whether the district court
erred in awarding LTM prejudgment interest for unpaid management fees at
a rate of three percent.551 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that interest on LTM’s unpaid management fees should have started accumulating
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when the contracts with the partnerships were terminated.552 Further, the
statutory interest rate for any legal indebtedness, when not specified in the
agreement, is six percent, rather than three percent.553 The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for calculation of prejudgment interest accordingly.554
In Red River Wings, Inc., the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the
district court’s dismissal of LTM’s counterclaim for intentional interference
with contractual relations and remanded for further findings.555 The court
reversed and remanded the award of derivative damages resulting from the
dissolution of the limited partnerships on an earlier date.556 The court also
reversed and remanded for entry of an order awarding prejudgment interest
to LTM at six percent from the date the management contracts were terminated.557 In all other respects, the district court was affirmed.558
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TORT LAW—WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION—DECEDENT’S
CHILDREN ENTITLED TO SEEK RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
WEIGEL V. LEE
In Weigel v. Lee,559 decedent’s children appealed the district court’s
dismissal of their wrongful death claims, arguing that the district court misconstrued the wrongful death statutes.560 The North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that a decedent’s children are able to seek
recovery of non-economic damages in a wrongful death action.561
On May 6, 2004, Darlyne Rogers went to the emergency room of St.
Luke’s Hospital in Crosby, North Dakota, where X-rays revealed she
suffered from pneumonia and a bowel obstruction.562 Rogers was
subsequently transferred to Trinity Hospital in Minot, North Dakota, as Dr.
Lane Lee’s patient.563 Although she was critically ill, Rogers was admitted
to a room on the “regular” floor of the hospital.564 Several hours later, she
began vomiting bodily waste and aspirating it into her lungs.565 She
ultimately died.566
Rogers’ adult children—Darla Weigel, Melody Frieson, Diana Seney,
and Lorna Strand—brought suit against Dr. Lee and Trinity Hospital, alleging negligence.567 Ultimately, after blending wrongful death actions, survival actions, and loss of consortium claims arising out of personal injury
actions, the district court dismissed the children’s claim, finding no recovery was proper.568
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district
court erred when it blended three distinct claims for tortious conduct: 1)
loss of consortium claims arising out of personal injury actions, 2) survival
actions, and 3) wrongful death actions.569 The court then distinguished each
claim using statutory interpretation, a question of law that is fully
reviewable on appeal.570
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First, the court stated, English common law recognized an action for
loss of consortium arising out of tortious conduct that resulted in personal
injury.571 In Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337,572 the court recognized that both spouses have a right to recover for loss of consortium, but
the court refused to extend that type of recovery to children.573 Here, however, the court noted that the refusal to extend recovery was inapplicable, as
the decedent’s children brought a wrongful death claim, not a claim for loss
of consortium arising out of tortious conduct that resulted in personal injury.574
Second, the court reviewed survival actions.575 Section 28-01-26.1 of
the North Dakota Century Code provides, “No action or claim for relief,
except for breach of promise, alienation of affections, libel, and slander,
abates by the death of a party or of a person who might have been a party
had such death not occurred.”576 Survival statutes are meant to permit
recovery by the representatives of the deceased for damages the deceased
could have recovered if he or she had lived.577 Again, the court noted, the
decedent’s children in the case at issue brought a wrongful death claim, not
a survival action, so the law concerning survival actions was
inapplicable.578
Third and finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed chapter
32-21 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides for wrongful
death actions.579 The decedent’s children offered the wrongful death act as
the legal basis for their claim, and the court concluded that they were entitled to seek compensation for Rogers’ wrongful death.580 The court wrote
that contemporary wrongful death statutes tend to address a broader scope
of injuries, including those considered non-pecuniary.581 Chapter 32-21 of
the North Dakota Century Code states:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful
act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as
would have entitled the party injured, if death had not ensued, to
571. Id. ¶ 10.
572. 246 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1976).
573. Weigel, ¶ 10, 752 N.W.2d at 621 (citing Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337, 246
N.W.2d 747, 749 (N.D. 1976)).
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maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then
and in every such case the person who, or the corporation, limited
liability company, or company which, would have been liable if
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured or of the tortfeasor, and although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to felony.582
This statute, the court wrote, is not a survival statute intended to increase the estate of the deceased, but rather a wrongful death statute, with
damages based on the loss suffered by the beneficiaries, not the loss sustained by decedent’s estate.583 Compensable damages available in wrongful
death actions are both economic, including those for medical expenses, loss
of earnings, and burial costs, and noneconomic, including damages for pain
and suffering, mental anguish, loss of society and companionship, and loss
of consortium.584
Intended recipients under the wrongful death act are “the decedent’s
heirs at law.”585 The court clarified that “heirs at law” for purposes of the
wrongful death statute are “those persons who by the laws of descent would
succeed to the property of the decedent in case of intestacy, but in addition,
that if members of a preferred class are precluded from recovery for reasons
other than death those next entitled to inherit may be considered beneficiaries.”586
The court also clarified that persons entitled to recover damages under
the wrongful death act should not be confused with persons statutorily authorized to bring an action.587 Section 32-21-03 of the North Dakota Century Code states that the action shall be brought by the following persons in
the order named:
1. The surviving husband or wife, if any.
2. The surviving children, if any.
3. The surviving mother or father.
4. A surviving grandparent.
5. The personal representative.
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6. A person who has had primary physical custody of the decedent before the wrongful act.
If any person entitled to bring the action refuses or neglects so
to do for a period of thirty days after demand of the person
next in order, that person may bring the action.588
The court went on to state that the distinction between persons eligible
to seek damages from wrongful death actions and those entitled to bring
such actions is important, because the trial judge must split recovery among
eligible heirs.589 Overlap may exist between plaintiffs bringing the action
and those entitled to damages, but the court emphasized that those able to
bring the action do not have an absolute right to the damages recovered;
they must instead bring the action in a representative capacity for the exclusive benefit of those entitled to recover.590 Thus, surviving children are eligible to bring a wrongful death action under section 32-21-03(2) of the
North Dakota Century Code if the decedent had no eligible spouse or if the
spouse fails to bring an action for thirty days after the children make a demand—a separate issue from that of whether children can recover damages
in a wrongful death action.591
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding
that a decedent’s children are entitled to seek recovery of damages in a
wrongful death action.592
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